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Federal Income Taxation
by Robert Beard*
and Gregory S. Lucas**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the year 2015, the federal courts in the United States Court of
Appeals for Eleventh Circuit's appellate jurisdiction addressed an issue
of first impression involving tax credits for research expenditures,
interpreted new Supreme Court precedent on the enforcement of
summonses issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and applied
state law doctrines of transferee liability in the context of "Midco" tax
shelters. This Article surveys those decisions.'
II.

GEOSYNTEC CONSULTANTS, INC. V. UNITED STATES

In Geosyntec Consultants, Inc. v. United States, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed a question of first
impression in the Circuit about a taxpayer's entitlement to research tax
credits under § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).' Adopting the
approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in FairchildIndustries, Inc. v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit held
that a taxpayer may only claim the research tax credit if the taxpayer
bears the economic risk when the research fails to yield the desired
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University (B.A., 2004); Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2007); University of
Florida Frederic G. Levin College of Law (LL.M., 2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
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1. For an analysis of federal taxation cases decided during the prior survey period, see
Robert Beard, Federal Taxation, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 66 MERCER L. REV. 1035 (2014).
2. 776 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2015).
3. I.R.C. § 41 (2012). Unless otherwise indicated, all "section" references are to the

Code, as amended.
4. 71 F.3d 868 (Fed. Cir. 1995), modified (Feb. 23, 1996).
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outcome.' If the taxpayer stands to be recompensed for its research
even in the event of such failure, it may not claim the credit.6
A.

Background

First introduced as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,'
the research tax credit of § 41 provides a twenty-percent tax deduction
for certain "qualified research expenses."" The credit is available both
for expenses incurred on in-house research and for a portion of expenses
paid to third parties for "contract research."' To be "qualified research,"
the research expenses must meet three criteria.o First, the expenses
must qualify as expenses under § 174,11 which means they must have
been incurred within the taxable year.' Further, "qualified research"
must be "undertaken for the purpose of discovering information-(i)
which is technological in nature, and (ii) the application of which is
intended to be useful in the development of a new or improved business
component of the taxpayer." 1 3 Finally, "substantially all of the activities" of the research must "constitute elements of a process of experimentation" for the purposes of functional innovation or improvement,
performance, or reliability or quality. 4
A taxpayer may not claim a credit for otherwise-qualifying research
if the research is "funded by any grant, contract, or otherwise by another
person (or governmental entity)."'" The Treasury Regulations clarify
that an expense only qualifies for the research tax credit if the taxpayer
"bear[s] the expense even if the research is not successful."" To
determine the extent to which research is funded by another person,
Treasury Regulation § 1.41-4A(d)" provides that "[a]mounts payable
under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research
and thus considered to be paid for the product or result of the research

5. Geosyntec Consultants, 776 F.3d at 1335-36.
6. Id. at 1336.
7. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
8. I.R.C. §H 41(a), (b)(1).
9. I.R.C. § 41(b)(1).
10. I.R.C. § 41(d)(1).
11. I.R.C. § 174 (2012).
12. I.R.C. § 41(d)(1)(A); see also I.R.C. § 174(a)(1).
13. I.R.C. § 41(d)(1)(B).
14. I.R.C. §§ 41(d)(1)(C), 41(d)(3)(A).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(c)(9) (2015) ("Qualified research does not include any research
to the extent funded by any grant, contract, or otherwise by another person (or
governmental entity).").
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(e)(2)(iii) (2015).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4A(d) (2015).
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(see § 1.41-2(e)(2)) are not treated as funding.""
Likewise, "[an
expense is paid or incurred for the performance of qualified research
only to the extent that it is paid or incurred pursuant to an agreement
that .. . [r]equires the taxpayer to bear the expense even if the research
is not successful."" Therefore, "[ilf an expense is paid or incurred
pursuant to an agreement under which payment is contingent on the
success of the research, then the expense is considered paid for the
product or result rather than the performance of the research, and the
"320
payment is not a [qualified] research expense ....
In FairchildIndustries, the Federal Circuit summarized the § 41 rules
on entitlement to the tax credit when the research is performed
pursuant to a contract with another party:
The regulations contain "mirror image" rules for determining when the
customer for the research, rather than the researcher, is entitled to
claim the tax credit. In accordance with Treasury Regulation § 1.412(e)(2) the contractual arrangement is the factor that determines who
is entitled to the tax benefit, for the customer may claim the credit only
if the agreement requires the customer to pay for the research even if
it is unsuccessful. If, however, the customer need not pay unless the
research is successful, the customer has "paid for the product or result
rather than the performance of the research" and can not claim the tax
credit because it has assumed no risk. Thus, the regulations implement allocation of the tax credit to the person that bears the financial
risk of failure of the research to produce the desired product or
result."'
The court in FairchildIndustries applied the above rule to a fixedprice incentive contract under which the taxpayer, Fairchild Industries,
Inc. (Fairchild), would design and produce a training aircraft for the Air
Force.22 The taxpayer's dispute with the IRS centered on whether
expenses incurred by Fairchild in producing prototype aircraft were
borne by Fairchild (and therefore eligible for the research tax credit) or
whether the Air Force's payments under its contract with Fairchild
should be treated as reimbursements of those expenses.2 3

18. Id. Although, on its own terms, Treasury Regulation § 1.41-4A only applies to
"[q]ualified research for taxable years beginning before January 1, 1986," id., Treasury
Regulation § 1.41-4(c)(9) incorporates by reference Treasury Regulation § 1.41-4A(d). See
Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(1)(9) (2015).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(e)(2)(iii).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(e) (2015).
21. 71 F.3d at 870 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(e)(2)) (internal citations omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 872.
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The United States Court of Federal Claims held Fairchild was not the
at-risk party for the failure of the research because it received advances
and progress payments during the course of the contract.2 ' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, reversed. 2 5
Because the contract was clear that Fairchild could only keep the
progress payments if the research was successful, Fairchild bore the
burden of failure. 26 The fact that the Air Force's advances financed the
research was not determinative because Fairchild would have had to
reimburse the Air Force in the case of failure. Under these facts, the
research was funded by Fairchild within the meaning of § 41.27
B.

The Geosyntec Opinion
In Geosyntec Consultants, the Eleventh Circuit applied the holding of
Fairchild Industries.28 The taxpayer, Geosyntec Consultants, Inc.
(Geosyntec), was an environmental consulting and engineering firm that
carried out research activities pursuant to hundreds of different
contracts with clients. Mercifully, the parties were able to identify six
representative contracts for detailed review by the court. Some of the
contracts were fixed-price contracts, pursuant to which Geosyntec was
paid an agreed price for a specified scope of work. The district court
found, and the IRS ultimately conceded, expenses incurred pursuant to
these agreements constituted qualifying research expenses. Three of the
contracts were "capped contracts," under which Geosyntec would be
reimbursed for labor costs and expenses actually incurred, plus a markup, subject to a maximum price cap. As in FairchildIndustries, the
question was whether the research performed pursuant to these capped
contracts was "funded" by a third party within the meaning of § 41. The
district court found that capped-contract research was funded by the
client and therefore was not eligible for the research tax credit. The
taxpayer appealed with respect to two of the capped contracts.29
The Eleventh Circuit first summarized the two contracts Geosyntec
Under the "Cherry Island Contract,"
presented on the appeal.o
Geosyntec was to design and engineer the expansion of the Cherry
Island Landfill. Geosyntec's total payments under the Cherry Island
Contract were capped at approximately $10 million, and payments for

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 872-73.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 873.
Id.
776 F.3d at 1332.
Id. at 1332-33.
Id. at 1336, 1337.
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different aspects of the project were subject to additional, separate caps.
Geosyntec received monthly payments based on its incurred costs.31
Under the second contract, the "WM Contract," Geosyntec was to
"evaluate technology for remediating groundwater beneath a warehouse
in Niagara, New York" for Waste Management, Inc (WM).3 2 The
contract required Geosyntec to "(1) perform laboratory bench tests to
evaluate the feasibility and performance of enhanced in situ bioremediation (EISB) for groundwater cleanup and (2) prepare a report describing
its methodology, tabulating the results, interpreting the data collected,
and discussing site conditions and potential pilot-test designs."" The
WM Contract was capped at approximately $19,000.14
The WM
Contract, like the Cherry Island Contract, required Geosyntec to submit
monthly invoices for which it would be reimbursed "upon proper
performance of each task at fixed unit prices as set forth in Geosyntec's
estimated budget."" The WM Contract provided for some modifications
of the fixed unit prices as well as of the tasks Geosyntec was required
to perform.36
In evaluating these agreements, the Eleventh Circuit applied the
reasoning of FairchildIndustries:
If Geosyntec was entitled to payment under both or either contract
regardless of the success of its research, it is not eligible to claim the
research tax credit; conversely, if payment to Geosyntec under both or
either contract was contingent on Geosyntec's successful research or
development of a product or process, Geosyntec is eligible to claim the
research tax credit.37
Relying on a comparison with the fixed-price incentive contract in
FairchildIndustries, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately determined both
contracts were "funded" within the meaning of § 41." The court first
rejected Geosyntec's argument that, because its compensation under the
contracts was capped and its billing was tied to its costs, "it ran the risk
of not receiving the full ceiling price or, conversely, of exceeding its own
budget"" This, the court noted was the wrong sense of "risk" for § 41
purposes: "[clost-of-performance is not the financial risk with which we

31.

Id. at 1333, 1336, 1337.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1337-38.
Id. at 1338.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
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are concerned because 'the only issue is whether payment was contingent on the success of the research'-that is, the financial risk of
failure. 40 The court further noted on this point that, under certain
circumstances, additional compensation would be available to Geosyntec
under the contracts.4 1
The court next pointed out "neither the Cherry Island Contract nor the
WM Contract expressly made [payment] to Geosyntec contingent on the
success of Geosyntec's research." 42 In other words, Geosyntec would be
paid for the research work carried out under the contracts even if the
result of the research was unfavorable to the client.4 ' This payment
scheme seems to have been the key factor distinguishing Geosyntec from
FairchildIndustries. If Fairchild had been unable to produce an aircraft
satisfying the Air Force's requirements due to an unexpected technical
or scientific hurdle, it would have received no payment under its
contract. By contrast, Geosyntec would have been paid even if its
research produced an unfavorable result.
Geosyntec argued its payments under these contracts were subject to
certain conditions, namely quality standards relating to the performance
of its services." The court dismissed this argument, emphasizing the
distinction between "proper performance" and "successful performance."" The court summarized:
Geosyntec was entitled to payment under both the Cherry Island
Contract and the WM Contract regardless of success. Both DSWA and
WM contracted with Geosyntec to reimburse Geosyntec for labor and
costs for pre-defined tasks at pre-defined rates. Neither the Cherry
Island Contract nor the WM Contract provided that DSWA or WM was
obligated to reimburse Geosyntec only if Geosyntec produced results
that met the contracts' specifications. Similarly, Geosyntec was not
entitled to payment only for work product delivered to and accepted by
its clients. Because payment to Geosyntec was not contingent on the
success of its research, Geosyntec did not bear the financial risk of its
own failure, and the two capped contracts were funded by Geosyntec's
clients.46

40. Id.

41. Id. at 1339-40.
42. Id. at 1340.
43. Id. at 1341.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1343 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted) (quoting
FairchildIndustries, 71 F.3d at 871).
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Accordingly, no research tax credit was permitted. The Eleventh
Circuit's holding is a logical extension of FairchildIndustries, and its
application of that case to several different economic arrangements is
instructive.
III.

UNITED STATES V. CLARKE

Pursuant to its investigative authority, the IRS may issue summonses.47 When the IRS issues a summons, but the summonsed party
"neglects or refuses to obey such summons," the IRS may seek judicial
The federal district courts have
enforcement of the summons."
jurisdiction to enforce those IRS summons.4 9 In a summons enforcement proceeding, it is initially the IRS's burden to make a prima facie
showing that "the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a
legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that
the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's
possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have
been followed.""o Once the IRS has met that burden, the party who has
been issued the IRS summons "may challenge the summons on any
appropriate ground."" Courts have generally concluded it is within the
district court's discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing
is warranted when there is such a challenge. However, the Eleventh
Circuit was, until recently, bound by old Fifth Circuit precedent that
held the summonsed party was entitled to "a limited adversary hearing
where the taxpayer may question IRS officials concerning the Service's
reasons for issuing the summons.52
A 2015 order 5 3 from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida is the latest episode in the federal courts' attempt
to determine whether Dynamo Holdings Limited Partnership (Dynamo)
and four individuals associated with it (collectively, the Dynamo Parties)
are entitled to an adversary hearing on their allegations the IRS had an
improper motive in issuing summonses to them.

47. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (2012).
48. I.R.C. § 7604(b) (2012).
49. I.R.C. §§ 7402(b), 7604(a) (2012).
50. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
51. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
52. United States v. Se. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 655 F.2d 661, 667 (5th Cir.
1981) (footnote omitted).
53. United States v. Clarke, Nos. 11-80456-MC-RYSKAMP/HOPKINS, 11-80457-MCKLR/JMH, 11-80459-MC-KLR/JMH, 11-80460-MC-KLR/JMH, 11-80461-MC-KLR/JMH,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33312 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2015), affd, No. 15-11663 (11th Cir. Mar.
15, 2016).
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Initial Proceedings in the DistrictCourt and Eleventh Circuit

The United States v. Clarke5 4 dispute arose from an IRS examination
of the large interest deductions Dynamo reported on its tax returns for
2005-2007.55 Dynamo agreed to two one-year extensions of the statute
of limitations period but refused to agree to a third in 2010. The IRS
issued summonses in September and October 2010 to the Dynamo
Parties. The Dynamo Parties refused to comply with the summonses.
Notwithstanding the failure to comply with the summonses, the IRS
timely issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment that
denied some of Dynamo's interest deductions, which Dynamo challenged
in the Tax Court in a suit filed in February 2011. Separately from that
litigation, the IRS filed suit in the Southern District of Florida in April
2011, seeking to compel the Dynamo Parties to comply with the
summonses.5 6

At the district court summons-enforcement proceedings, the IRS
submitted affidavits from the investigating agents to make the required
showing under United States v. Powell," and the Dynamo Parties
responded with various challenges. In particular, the Dynamo Parties
argued the circumstantial evidence supported their position that the IRS
had issued the summonses as retribution for Dynamo not agreeing to the
third extension of the statute of limitations. Those summonses were
issued despite the fact that the IRS had not recently requested any
information from the Dynamo Parties. The Dynamo Parties further
alleged the IRS sought to enforce the summonses in the district court
only after Dynamo challenged the IRS's adjustment in the Tax Court as
an underhanded way of subverting the Tax Court's discovery rules. The
Dynamo Parties moved to depose the IRS agents who had made the
affidavits in the hopes of establishing that improper motivations were
behind the summonses. The district court denied that request and
ordered the Dynamo Parties to comply with the summons."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court in a short
per curiam opinion." Citing binding Eleventh Circuit precedent that
"an allegation of improper purpose is sufficient to trigger a limited
adversary hearing where the taxpayer may question IRS officials

54. 134 S. Ct. 2361 (2014).
55. Id. at 2365.
56. Id. at 2365, 2365-66, 2366.
57. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
58. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2366.
59. United States v. Clarke, 517 F. App'x 689 (11th Cir. 2013).
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concerning the Service's reasons for issuing the summons,"" the court
held that the Dynamo Parties were "entitled to a hearing to explore their
allegation of an improper purpose."" The reasoning behind that rule,
the court explained, was that "requiring the taxpayer to provide factual
support for an allegation of an improper purpose, without giving the
taxpayer a meaningful opportunity to obtain such facts, saddles the
taxpayer with an unreasonable circular burden, creating an impermissible 'Catch 22.'"" Thus, the court remanded so the Dynamo Parties
could question the IRS agents about any improper motive in issuing and
seeking to enforce the summonses."
The United States then filed a certiorari petition with the United
States Supreme Court, which was granted."
The Supreme Court Vacates and Remands

B.

Noting that "[elvery other Court of Appeals has rejected the Eleventh
Circuit's view that a bare allegation of improper motive entitles a person
objecting to an IRS summons to examine the responsible officials," the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case.65
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court
explained that although summons proceedings are adversarial rather
than ex parte, they are nonetheless "summary in nature."" In the tax
context, the summons "is a crucial backstop in a tax system based on
self-reporting."" Thus, it is sensible "that courts may ask only whether
the IRS issued a summons in good faith, and must eschew any broader
role of 'oversee[ing] the [IRS's] determinations to investigate.'"" The
Court set out the applicable rule:
As part of the adversarial process concerning a summons's validity, the
taxpayer is entitled to examine an IRS agent when he can point to
specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of bad
faith. Naked allegations of improper purpose are not enough: The
taxpayer must offer some credible evidence supporting his charge. But
circumstantial evidence can suffice to meet that burden; after all, direct
evidence of another person's bad faith, at this threshold stage, will

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 691 (quoting Se. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 655 F.2d at 667).
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014).
Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2367.
Id. (quoting United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Powell, 379 U.S. at 56).
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rarely if ever be available. And although bare assertion or conjecture
is not enough, neither is a fleshed out case demanded: The taxpayer
need only make a showing of facts that give rise to a plausible
inference of improper motive. That standard will ensure inquiry where
the facts and circumstances make inquiry appropriate, without turning
every summons dispute into a fishing expedition for official wrongdoing.69

Because the Eleventh Circuit had "viewed even bare allegations of
improper purpose as entitling a summons objector to question IRS

agents," it applied the incorrect standard.70 Rather than that incorrect
categorical rule, the Supreme Court instructed the Eleventh Circuit to
determine whether the circumstantial evidence produced by the Dynamo

Parties raised a plausible inference of bad faith.n
The Supreme Court mentioned the two theories of improper motive
that the Dynamo Parties had put forward but, noting that the legal
sufficiency of those theories was beyond the scope of its review,
remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for further proceedings.7 2
The Eleventh Circuit further remanded the case to the district court so
that it could apply the Supreme Court's standard."
C.

Proceedings Upon Remand

The district court applied the Supreme Court's standard to "determine
whether Respondents point to specific facts or circumstances that
plausibly raise an inference of improper purpose and to determine

whether the improper purposes alleged by Respondents are improper as
a matter of law." 74 The district court did not reach the factual issue
because it found the Dynamo Parties' various challenges to the IRS
summons failed as a matter of law. 75 First, "[t]hat a secondary use of
the requested information may exist . . . does not render the request for
the information improper."7
Second, the court found "unsupported by
any evidence" the allegation the summons were issued to punish

Dynamo for not agreeing to the third statute of limitations waiver.7 7
It stated that "[i]f information remains to be gathered and the statute
of limitation has expired, the IRS has no alternative but to institute a

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 2367-68.
Id. at 2368.
Id.
Id. at 2369.
See United States v. Clarke, 573 F. App'x 826, 827-28 (11th Cir. 2014).
Clarke, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33312, at *1.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
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formal summons process ."78 Third, the district court rejected the
argument that "the Government's power to enforce a summons terminates when a taxpayer petitions the Tax Court because such could allow
the Government to obtain more information than it could by Tax Court
discovery rules."7 The court explained that "[t]he validity of a summons is tested at the date of issuance, and events occurring after the
date of issuance but prior to enforcement should not affect enforceability."" The district court further disposed of the Dynamo Parties'
argument that comity prevented enforcement of the summons in the
district court "because enforcement of the summons is the same
proceeding pending before the Tax Court."" Because the Tax Court
lacks jurisdiction over summons proceedings, the court noted that the
two proceedings were not the same." Finally, the Dynamo Parties'
argument that "the issuance of the summons may have violated the
intent of the Internal Revenue Manual" was rejected because the
Internal Revenue Manual "confers no rights on [taxpayers]."" With
that, the district court ordered that the summonses would be enforced."
With the resolution of the Clarke litigation, the Eleventh Circuit has
now been brought into line with its sister circuits on the evidentiary
standard to apply in summons-enforcement proceedings where the
summonsed party seeks to question the IRS examiners.
IV.

MIDCO SHELTERS AND TRANSFEREE LIABILITY

The third notable area of tax decisions within the Eleventh Circuit
involves "Midco" tax shelters and state law doctrines of transferee
liability. Two cases, decided in the Tax Court but appealable to the
Eleventh Circuit, addressed this issue.
A.

Midco ransactions

A Midco transaction is a tax shelter that attempts to circumvent the
fundamental tax conflict between buyers and sellers in the sale of a
corporate business." The basic structuring question in such a sale is
whether to accomplish the transaction through a sale of the corporation's

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at *4, *7.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4, *7.
Id.
Id. at *5, *6.
Id. at *7.
See Diebold Found., Inc. v. Comm'r, 736 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2013).
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stock by the shareholders or through a sale of the corporation's assets by
the corporation itself.86 When shareholders transfer a corporation
through a stock sale, they will recognize gain equal to the difference
between their bases in the stock and the purchase price.
The
corporation pays no tax since it continues to own all of its assets.88
Thus, there is only one layer of taxation in a stock sale. The buyer,
however, will inherit the corporation's historic basis in its assets, no
matter how much the buyer paid for the corporation's stock." If the
corporation's assets have appreciated in value compared to their tax
basis, the buyer will generally not be able to recoup its tax investment
through depreciation deductions going forward because corporate stock
is not depreciable and the tax basis of any depreciable corporate assets
is unaffected by the transactions."
For this reason, the buyer may be willing to pay a higher price if it
can purchase assets from the corporation and then have the corporation
liquidate and distribute the after-tax sales proceeds to the shareholders.
This structure gives the buyer a purchase price basis in any depreciable
property of the corporation, but it also introduces a second layer of

taxation: first on the corporation when it sells the assets, then on the
shareholders when the corporation distributes the cash in liquidation."

Thus, the shareholders selling the corporation generally prefer to
structure the transaction as a stock sale, rather than an asset sale, but
the buyer generally prefers the opposite.9 2
The Midco transaction purports to allow both parties to receive their
preferred treatment: sellers get a stock sale and buyers get an asset
sale." The structure of a Midco tax shelter has been summarized by

the Second Circuit:
"Midco transactions" or "intermediary transactions" are structured to
allow the parties to have it both ways: letting the seller engage in a
stock sale and the buyer engage in an asset purchase. In such a
transaction, the selling shareholders sell their C Corp stock to an

86. See id. at 175.
87. Got Stock? Cost Basis Rules May Impact Taxes, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2012, 12:24 PM),
www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/01/19/got-stock-cost-basis-rules-may-impacttaxes/#10bdbd7616d6.
88. Diebold, 736 F.3d at 175.
89. Asset Sale vs Stock Sale: What's The Difference?, ALLIED BUSINESS GROUP,
www.alliedbizgroup.com/resources/publications/asset-sale-vs-stock-sale.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2016).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Diebold, 736 F.3d at 175.
93. Id.

2016]

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

941

intermediary entity (or "Midco") at a purchase price that does not
discount for the built-in gain tax liability, as a stock sale to the
ultimate purchaser would. The Midco then sells the assets of the C
Corp to the buyer, who gets a purchase price basis in the assets. The
Mideo keeps the difference between the asset sale price and the stock
purchase price as its fee. The Midco's willingness to allow both buyer
and seller to avoid the tax consequences inherent in holding appreciated assets in a C Corp is based on a claimed tax-exempt status or
supposed tax attributes, such as losses, that allow it to absorb the
built-in gain tax liability. 9 4

If the IRS successfully challenges the claimed treatment of the Midco
transaction, however, it may face additional challenges in collecting the
unpaid tax:
If these tax attributes of the Midco prove to be artificial, then the tax
liability created by the built-in gain on the sold assets still needs to be
paid. In many instances, the Midco is a newly formed entity created for
the sole purpose of facilitating such a transaction, without other income
or assets and thus likely to be judgment-proof. The IRS must then
seek payment from the other parties involved in the transaction in
order to satisfy the tax liability the transaction was created to avoid."

In a successfully challenged Midco transaction, the primary taxpayer-the transferred corporation-has invariably been liquidated by the
time the IRS is able to assess a tax against it." The Midco, as noted
above, is often judgment-proof."
The purchaser of the assets is
typically in the position of having purchased assets in good faith for
value, so it may be challenging to frame a case for secondary liability
against the purchaser." Faced with these facts, the government has
sometimes chosen to pursue the selling shareholders under § 6901,99
which allows the IRS to assess tax liabilities against certain transferees"o

However, the Supreme Court long ago held, in discussing the

predecessor statute to § 6901, that it "neither creates nor defines a
substantive liability but provides merely a new procedure by which the
Government may collect taxes.""o' Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad
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'

Co. v. Tompkins, 1 0 2 "the existence and extent of liability should be
determined by state law."1 03 Thus, to impose the unpaid tax on one of
the other parties to the Midco transaction, the IRS must first establish
that party's liability under state law doctrines of transferee liability,
much as any ordinary creditor would in pursuing the transferee of a
debtor's assets.'0o Only then, if that party is a transferee for purposes
of § 6901, may the IRS pursue it as liable for the unpaid tax.' 0
B.

'Too Tax Court Cases

Two 2015 cases decided in the Tax Court, but appealable to the
Eleventh Circuit, addressed the issue of transferee liability in Midco
transactions. In Shockley v. Commissioner,106 the Tax Court applied
the Wisconsin Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (WIUFTA)1 07 in determining that the shareholders of a corporation sold through a Midco
transaction were liable for the Midco's unpaid tax.'
In Alterman v.
Commissioner,oo however, the Tax Court found numerous "evidentiary
holes" in the IRS's contention that, under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (FUFTA),"o the selling shareholders of a corporation
were liable."' Although both statutes adopt (with some modifications)
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, these two cases show how that
law can yield very different results in the context of Midco transactions,
depending in large part on what evidence the IRS has of intent or bad
faith.
In Shockley, the petitioners, now residents of Florida, were former
shareholders of a closely held corporation that owned television and
radio stations in Wisconsin. When the petitioners decided to sell the
company, they engaged a media broker to help facilitate a stock sale. A
particular challenge in the transaction was that purchasers were most
likely expected to want either the corporation's television or radio assets,
but not both. Because of the petitioners' desire for a stock sale and any
potential purchaser's desire for a piecemeal asset sale, a Midco
transaction was particularly appealing. Eventually, with the help of
their broker, the petitioners negotiated a set of three agreements,
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See id. at 183-84.
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pursuant to which they agreed (through a complicated series of steps,
the details of which are not relevant to this discussion) to sell their
shares in the company to an intermediary corporation formed specifically
for that purpose, which would then sell the assets to two other companies.112
The petitioners in Shockley had been notified at the outset that these
transactions are sometimes challenged by the IRS. They were even sent
copies of IRS Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 CB 730,113 which first identified
Midco transactions as among those "listed transactions" the IRS can
challenge legally.1 1 4 Further, the petitioners had "[1]eading up to and
throughout the closing, . . . engaged experienced professionals and
attorneys to handle complicated areas of the transactions including ...
taxation.""
In the Tax Court, the IRS sought to disregard the form of the
transaction and characterize it as an asset sale and further sought to
collect unpaid taxes (including penalties and interest) from the former
shareholders. 116 Despite the petitioners' argument that the substanceover-form doctrine was inapplicable under WIUFTA, the Tax Court,
relying on a recent United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit opinion, held that "state fraudulent-transfer law is itself flexible
and looks to equitable principles like 'substance over form,' just like the
federal tax doctrines.""' Further relying on the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of WIUFTA, the Tax Court noted that "subjective intent
and good faith play no role in the application of WIUFTA's constructive
fraud provisions.""' Thus, the Tax Court held the substance-over-form
principle applied to the transaction."19
Having set out that principle as its guide, the Tax Court had little
trouble determining that the complex structure of the series of transactions involving entities created for no other purpose than tax avoidance
was "a prime example of how a transaction can be structured so that its
form might meet the letter of the law, but it nevertheless is being used
in a manner incongruous with the intent of that law."'20 The court
concluded, "The Midco transaction is therefore disregarded," and
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recharacterized the transaction as an asset sale with subsequent
distribution in de facto liquidation of the corporation.' 2 ' Under this
recharacterization, WIUFTA would clearly apply, and the IRS was
permitted to assert the corporate-level tax liability against the former
shareholders.' 22
A strikingly different conclusion was reached in Alterman, a consolidated set of cases involving another Midco transaction. In this case, the
corporation operated a trucking business. After the death of its founder,
his heirs decided to wind up the business. Over the course of 2003, the
corporation sold off its business assets. Instead of liquidating the entity,
however, the shareholders sold its stock to MidCoast, which represented
itself as being engaged in the credit-card receivables business.
According to MidCoast, it wanted to acquire the corporate shell because
the nature of its business would permit it to defer the tax liability
associated with the 2003 asset sales and obtain a refund of the
estimated 2003 taxes that had been paid by the corporation. The
shareholders, who were represented by experienced counsel, conducted
thorough due diligence on the acquirer and obtained extensive contractual undertakings that the acquirer would cause the corporation to pay its
tax liabilities and remain in existence as an operating business entity for
at least four years. On these terms, the shareholders sold their stock to
MidCoast. Unbeknownst to the sellers, MidCoast had no intention of
using the corporation for any business purpose and promptly resold the
stock to another entity, which transferred the corporation's remaining
cash assets to an offshore bank account and made no provision for
payment of the tax liability from the 2003 asset sales. MidCoast was
subsequently sued for fraud by the selling shareholders, and a number
of MidCoast principals were federally indicted.1 23
The IRS asserted transferee liability under § 6901 against the sellers.
As discussed above, § 6901 requires the IRS to demonstrate the
transferee would be liable to a creditor of the transferor under the
fraudulent conveyance or similar law of the applicable state (in this case,
Florida). In attempting to make this showing, the IRS argued that the
court should recast the transactions in accordance with federal
substance-over-form principles prior to making the state law determination of whether transferee liability existed.124 The Tax Court summarily refused to do this, deeming it "well established that the
Commissioner cannot recast transactions under Federal law and then

121. Id. at *43.
122. Id. at *51.
123. Alterman, 2015 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 239, at *4, *6-7, *8, *11, *18, *27, *33.
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apply state law to the transactions as recast."1 25 The court further
determined the form of the transaction would be respected under Florida
fraudulent conveyance law because the sellers lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the intended fraud, exercised due diligence, and
reasonably believed MidCoast would honor its contractual agreements
to discharge the tax liabilities of the corporation.' 2 6 The court noted
that sellers of a corporation have only limited responsibilities in getting
assurances from the buyer that any subsequent tax liabilities will be
satisfied.1 27 The Tax Court went on to dismiss a number of theories
that might have established transferee liability under Florida law.1 28
At first glance, Shockley and Alterman seem hard to reconcile. In the
first case, the Tax Court allowed the IRS to recast the facts of the
transaction using federal tax law principles to establish the state law
requirements for transferee liability. By contrast, the Alterman court
held the IRS to the actual form of the transaction for conducting the
state law analysis even if that form could be recharacterized for federal
tax purposes. The likely resolution of this apparent inconsistency is that
the recast permitted in Shockley, though made by applying federal tax
principles, was (at least in the court's judgment) required by Wisconsin
state law. That is to say, the Tax Court (relying on an Seventh Circuit
precedent) concluded Wisconsin law calls for substance-over-form
principles similar to those of federal tax law to be applied to determine
when transferee liability exists. In Alterman, on the other hand, the
court interpreted Florida law to permit a recast only where the
transferee had actual or constructive knowledge of the entire scheme.
Since the court found this requirement was not met in Alterman, the IRS
was held to the form of the transaction and was subsequently unable to
establish transferee liability.
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